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Will AUKUS Actually Deliver For Australia?

(15/04/2025)

I remember in my later high school years when the Attack Class deal was cancelled and AUKUS was announced the many uproars from classmates (who, like me, had admittedly a naïve understanding of defence and geopolitics) that abandoning France and spending all this money on a new program was a waste of money. Money, which they thought would be better spent on the nebulous slogans of “the cost of living crisis” or “the NDIA backlog”. It is only natural for people to feel this way, why should we commit billions of dollars to programs which ostensibly don’t affect us directly, we will never see, and many say will never use.

It’s this attitude, however, that underpins the Australian population’s general apathy towards defence. And it is that concern which drives me to give an overview of just how important a move like this is for Australia’s standing in the region, a region which grows more uncertain by the month. This will neither be a comprehensive look at either the agreement itself, the ‘Pillars’ or the submarines themselves, but instead a broad outline, responding to two major questions that underpin consideration of AUKUS’ effectiveness. Those big questions are:

• Whether both the Virginia Class SSNs and AUKUS Class SSNs will actually be delivered?
• Will our acquisition of nuclear submarines answer Australia’s strategic concerns?

Will it actually be delivered?

Viriginia Class

A key component of the agreement which has, and will be, on the tongues of all commentators is Australia’s acquisition of three, with the possibility of two more Virginia Class SSNs (short for Ship Submersible Nuclear i.e. nuclear subs.) Such a purchase raises concerns as to whether the American military shipbuilding industry will be able to handle a loss of upwards of 20% of its expanding Virginia fleet. Such a depletion has already accelerated contracts to expand its own Virginia fleet and especially, many wonder whether the industry, following a slowdown during COVID, can handle that as well as an additional Virginia Block VII submarine purpose-built for Australia.

However, this anxiety can quite easily be put to rest by the fact that both parties across the ocean agree that a revitalisation of US shipbuilding is critical. President Trump, in an attempt to boost American commercial and military maritime industries, pledged tax incentives for domestic companies as well as a USD$1.5 million fee on Chinese ships coming to the US. Similarly, Australia’s commitment to give USD$3 billion over four years to help US Virginia shipbuilding can put most at ease that, unless something catastrophic like COVID were to occur again, American ships will be christened at much faster rates and a delivery of the purchased subs to Australia is almost certain.

AUKUS Class

A perhaps more tentative hope rests on the ability for UK dockyards to handle the construction of a whopping three classes: Astute, Dreadnought, and AUKUS. All of this coming at a time when Britain certainly isn’t sending fleets of battleships and heavy cruisers down the Clyde like it once might have. That is to say, the glory days of the Grand Fleet are over and submarine production has certainly been the victim of austere measures that have scaled down the Royal Navy to a comparatively weak posture. This raises the concern as to whether the sub-building hub at Barrow will be capable of handling the pressures of the AUKUS agreement.

Although certainly a more credible compromising piece to the integrity of the agreement, what can potentially alleviate this are a number of different factors. First is that, with the seemingly constant stream of nuclear submarine production, it can be hoped that the workers and specialists will both be more willing to stay with the shipyards as well as transfer skills between already similar platforms. Second, the modular design of the AUKUS Class allows for large parts of construction as well as the entire assembly to occur domestically in Australia, relieving the pressure on Barrow and allowing it to focus its attention on not only the Astute and Dreadnought Classes, but also their own domestically made AUKUS submarines. Finally, a similar commitment from Australia of AUD$4 billion over four years to British submarine shipbuilding will also, like for the US, help rejig maritime production to standards that will allow it to meet such a large order. With that, it can be more hopeful that the production of submarines will be followed through on.

Will the program actually answer Australia's Strategic Concerns?

Timeline

A key accusation of many is that such a deal leaves Australia quite exposed, waiting another ~7 years until we get the Virginias and at the minimum ~15–20 years until we start getting AUKUS subs into the water. Such a gap leaves ample exploitable time in the event of a regional crisis. However, all the talk of “War and invasion imminent!” seems mainly to just be coming from hawkish, warmongering types. Such people have been heralding doomsday within the year since 2019 (as far back as I can remember), and nothing has come from it. Whilst the Russian invasion of Ukraine certainly came as a shock to many, a similar conflict erupting within the decade, especially at a time when America and the West in general aren’t scaling back their militaries like they once might have, is just infeasible. With that, the gap until Virginia acquisition seems less of a gaping hole and more of a small hole that will quietly be filled in a short time.

A more pressing concern though is 15–20 years into the future. I don’t want to begin speculating, but one only needs to look at the 19th century to know that great powers and world orders can dramatically change within the span of decades. The world of now and the 2040s will certainly look different, and it is more uncertain whether, by that time, completion of the planned AUKUS subs will be possible. Hopefully, Rotational Force West and East might provide a stopgap in the meantime. The rotational forces outline a number of US and UK SSNs to be in constant rotation in Australian ports, mainly for training purposes, but in the event of a crisis, could be deployed as a fast response force. That would potentially shore up the time in acquiring AUKUS SSNs and ensure a potent naval deterrent in the region for the foreseeable decades.

The SSN Capability

A discussion of the intricacies of both the Virginia and AUKUS submarines is out of the scope of this but two qualities, namely indiscretion and range, are key to understanding the deal's importance to Australia’s naval buildup.

Discretion

The indiscretion rate of a submarine simply means the time that it has to spend in a compromised state, or one that leaves it vulnerable to detection. Indiscrete actions may include either directly surfacing or near-surfacing for periscoping or snorkelling. With no need to snorkel like all diesel submarines, SSNs simply provide unparalleled secrecy. This means they can operate almost entirely underwater with no need to surface. Recent news like a 204-day-long patrol of a UK Astute Class SSN goes to show that nuclear technology is a quantum leap in the capability for submarines to operate without detection. Rates like this make orbital and surface detection almost impossible and mean SSNs can patrol anywhere with much greater operational security, leaving the door open for more attack opportunities.

Range

Nuclear Submarines, by their very nature, have practically unlimited power until the fuel rods run out after 30 or so years, only hampered by the capacity for provisions. And with a propulsion system that is entirely air-independent, SSNs can deliver a potent maritime force almost anywhere. What this does is extend on the Collins class’s relatively weak range of 9,000 nautical miles at periscope depth and allows Australia to operate a submarine force anywhere in the Indo-Pacific region. This has the possibility to place serious threat to vital avenues of commercial trade as well as allowing operational flexibility otherwise unthinkable for the Collins.

The Strait of Malacca sees ~60% of Chinese trade (especially oil from the Middle East). Although a shift from Saudi Arabian to Russian oil is already underway, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to stop being a vital part of Chinese imports any time soon. That, as well as other trade around the world, means that if Australia were to take advantage of this weakness, it could put major strain on Chinese civilian and warfighting capabilities. Even just the presence of such a capability would seriously hamper Chinese attempts to safely conduct military operations in the region. Even with a rapidly developing Chinese Anti-Submarine Warfare program, it will take time to see whether this will be enough. Additionally, with the discretion that an SSN provides, it has the potential to be a major player in the balance of power in a regional crisis.

Such opportunities can only be afforded with the range of a nuclear submarine and place in the hands of Australia a seriously powerful armament.

Conclusion

In the end, whilst the practical implications of such a deal lay out of the eyes of most in the public, what cannot be debated is the unprecedented leap that Australia is being afforded with such an acquisition. Will they be delivered? Speculation into the 2040s may be too long off but the Virginias and a constant presence of SSNs in the region for the foreseeable future is for sure. What do they provide? Only one of the most important developments in Australia’s maritime history, giving secrecy and range that otherwise would have been unthinkable. Ultimately though, Australia is finally being recognised as a major regional naval power, capable of wielding a force that will be a force to be reckoned with in the future.